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Safe Operations Above FL600
Abstract
With the increase in likelihood of near-term development of revenue-generating point-topoint suborbital flights and the increase in high-altitude-long-endurance commercial
operations above FL600, the criticality of addressing operations above this altitude has
never been more pressing. While the Federal Aviation Administration describes the
National Airspace System, it doesn’t offer a description that includes a top and most
descriptions do not address the altitude above FL600 at all leaving most to assume the
top of the US National Airspace System is FL600. Technological, physiological, physical
and administrative limitations have relegated most air operations to FL600 and below.
As that changes, previous work on Space Traffic Management (STM) concepts begin to
take on new life and add to sincere considerations for adaptation or changes in existing
responsibilities, authorities and capabilities of STM stakeholders. As the FAA transitions
to the NextGen architecture, those limitations that prevented humans from routinely
operating above FL600 will being to dissolve and new legal and regulatory regimes will
need to be developed and their impact on existing international agreements will require
global consideration of STM implementation. Without the technical facility-limitations of
Very High Frequency Omni-direction Ranges (VORs) as the primary navigation
component of the National Airspace System, a satellite-based system opens up the
possibility of redefining the top of Class Aairspace and the top of the U.S. National
Airspace System to, potentially, the Kármán line and providing the responsibility,
authority, and capability the FAA currently lacks above FL600. This idea would foster
routine, revenue-producing, point-to-point suborbital flights and help to sustain a safe,
accessible space domain. The U.S. Senate has recently offered legislation to begin
addressing the need for a STM concept and recent developments in the Department of
Defense suggest a willingness to begin earnest efforts toward sharing the Joint Space
Operations Center workload. Given the technological need and the willingness of the
U.S. Government to begin to address the issue, a functioning STM capability is closer to
reality than ever.

Introduction
Although technological advances are improving the performance of aerospace vehicles,
the majority of 102,000 daily flight operations over the United Statesi take place between
the surface and approximately 38,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL). The FAA helps
to ensure the safety of these flights and the safety of the general public by maintaining
and operating the National Airspace System. Above 18,000 feet (above mean sea level)
the FAA considers altitudes to be “Flight Levels”. 18,000 feet to Flight Level 6-0-0
(FL600) are considered Class A airspace and represents a significant delineation
between where most aerospace activities occur and the sparsely populated areas above.
Until recently, aviation activities above FL600 were very rare, but as technology pushes
the limits of aviation, the U.S. government and commercial interests have begun to
develop and operate systems that operate, sometimes for weeks to months at a time,
above the Class A airspace. These activities further blur the lines between aviation and
space as well as suggest expansion of the FAA surveillance capabilities and involvement
with regard to operations in the U.S. airspace above FL600. Some of this needed
capability will be addressed under evolving FAA programs such as NextGen. Further
consideration has to be given to the physical and electromagnetic deconfliction of
operations above, below and across the Kármán Line. As these items are addressed the
capabilities, authorities and responsibilities of existing stakeholder could evolve, shift or
new capabilities, authorities or responsibilities might need to be created for existing, or
even new stakeholders. Developing a method to handle increased atmospheric traffic will
have to be done in conjunction with methods to maintain a safe, accessible and
sustainable suborbital and orbital domain. Starting with previous work on the subject will
help focus the effort and ensure a feasible STM concept can be developed in a manner
so as to ensure the need for it stays ahead of the technological advances that create the
requirement.
Why is FL600 significant?
Technical aspects of the National Airspace System, human physiology, as well as the
laws of physics and economics relegate most traditional aviation to operations below
FL600. Aside from the fact that, in the middle latitudes, FL600 is the approximate top of
the troposphere, altitudes above this pose a much higher safety risk to commercial
activities because it offers very little promise for survivability of humans without a full
pressure suit in the event of malfunctions of aircraft systems (even if oxygen is
available). Traditional aircraft engines also lose efficiency above the troposphere
(surface to approximately 60,000 feet) and operating a vehicle at those altitudes poses
significant aerodynamic issues that make commercial operations less profitable than
traditional operations. As an aircraft approaches an altitude of approximately 327,000
feet (in the middle latitudes) the speed required to produce aerodynamic lift becomes
greater than that required to achieve orbital velocity and the aircraft then becomes a

spacecraft. This altitude varies across the globe but is referred to as the Kármán Line
after the Hungarian-American physicist Theodore von Kármán who first described it.
In addition to physiology, physics and economics, the navigation components that make
up the National Airspace System were likely the driving factor for choosing FL600 as the
top of the Class A airspace. The airspace above the Continental United States’ land
mass is commonly referred to as being within the U.S. National Airspace System. Even
though the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) describes the National Airspace
System in numerous publications, an attempt to find a valid description that defines its
top at FL600 will prove to be impossible. An FAA description of the National Airspace
System from the 2015 Pilot/Controller Glossary looks like this:

NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM− The common network of U.S. airspace;
air navigation facilities, equipment and services, airports or landing areas;
aeronautical charts, information and services; rules, regulations and
procedures, technical information, and manpower and material. Included
are system components shared jointly with the militaryii.
Although technically inaccurate, a working definition by those most often involved in
operating within the National Airspace System would include the top to be at the
maximum altitude of the Class A airspace, or FL600 iii. In fact, most graphics used to
teach new aviators about airspace does not address altitudes above FL600 (See Fig 1).

Figure 1: Airspace, FAA's Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge iv
The top of the Class A airspace could have been chosen for any of the reasons
mentioned above, but when considered as part of a “system”, the Class A airspace max
altitude was most likely chosen based on limiting factors of other components of the
system. The “Air Navigation Facilities” that served as the primary means of navigation

for National Airspace System users since 1946 has been the Very High Frequency
Omni-Direction Range (VOR). The network of airways that crisscross the United States
radiate from these facilities and serve as the primary means by which the majority of air
traffic is moved around the country in an orderly manner. A detailed description of
operational use of a VOR can be found in section 2 of the FAA’s Airman’s Information
Manual. This description includes the top of the service volume for the high-altitude
VORs, which is 60,000 feet above the VOR facilityv. Although this altitude is marginally
different than the FL600 (because service volume is measured above ground level on
which the VOR is placed), the top of the National Airspace System’s Class A airspace is
uniform across the Continental United States and ensures any air traffic being routed at
that altitude would have access to reliable VOR navigation capabilities.
This does not, however, mean that the FAA authority ends at FL600. Federal Aviation
Regulations §71.71, Class E airspace, describes what FAA authority exists above FL600
by defining Class E airspace as:
The airspace of the United States, including that airspace overlying the
waters within 12 nautical miles of the coast of the 48 contiguous states and
Alaska, extending upward from 14,500 feet MSL up to, but not including
18,000 feet MSL, and the airspace above FL600, excluding The Alaska
peninsula west of longitude 160°00′00″ W. and the airspace below 1,500 feet
above the surface of the earth.vi

Figure 2: Airspace Designations vii
To better understand operations above FL600 the information above must be considered
in conjunction with the FAA’s authority and a study of 49 U.S. Code § 40103 Sovereignty and use of airspace:

The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall develop plans
and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or
order the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and
the efficient use of airspace. The Administrator may modify or revoke an
assignment when required in the public interest.
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe air traffic regulations on the flight of
aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for—
(A) navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft
(B) protecting individuals and property on the ground;
(C) using the navigable airspace efficiently; and
(D) preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or water
vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.viii
A third piece to understanding this issue is a common set of terms and most critical is
the definition of the term “aircraft”. From 49 U.S. Code §1.1 “Aircraft means a device
that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air” ix. Using the definitions of Class E
airspace, the FAA authority from 49 U.S. Code § 40103, and the term “aircraft”, the
argument could be made that the FAA has the authority to regulate air traffic from over
the United States from just above the surface to a point where “the atmosphere
becomes too thin to support aeronautical flight, or the Kármán line.
While no Air Traffic Control clearance or radio communication is required for VFR flight
in class E airspace, it is still considered “controlled” airspace based on the International
Civil Aviation Organization definition of “controlled airspace”, which is “airspace in which
flight under instrument flight rules is allowed” x. This means the FAA has both authority
and responsibility for airspace above FL600. However, given the limitations of the
current National Airspace System (VOR navigation limitations, tracking, and
communications), it currently lacks the full capability to effectively control traffic or
enforce regulations at these altitudes.
What is flying above FL600 right now?
There have been aircraft with the ability to fly between FL600 and the Kármán line for
many years. Most notably, early experimental aircraft such as the North American X-15
which flew up to 62 miles (327,000 feet) above the Earthxi. During testing, F-15s were
certified by the Department of Defense to fly at FL800 (with restrictions). F-22s routinely
fly at FL600 to improve supercruise performance and Lockheed U-2s also routinely fly
above FL600. Aside from these, and other manned military aircraft, there are
Department of Defense Unmanned Vehicles, weather balloons, experimental
governmental vehicles, and experimental commercial applications such as the Google
Project Loonxii which are now common place in atmospheric operations above FL600.
Objects that transit the area between FL600 and the Kármán line are also becoming
more frequent with testing of suborbital systems such as Virgin Galactic’s Spaceship1,

XCOR’s Lynx vehicle and others. Additionally, commercial efforts to enter the more
traditional spacelift market are growing in number as well. SpaceX, Armadillo
Aerospace and Orbital Science are all in the testing phases of their respective programs.
Each company is launching experimental systems above FL600 on a semi-regular basis.
These programs also highlight that operations above FL600 are not restricted to
operations below the Kármán line.
It’s important that during a discussion regarding operations above FL600 that a stark
distinction between suborbital and orbital objects is not created in such a manner as to
cause the management of each to be considered independently. While drastically
different issues confront each area of operation, the overlaps between the two require
that they be studied simultaneously, especially with the credible potential for near-term
routine operations which span both areas as well as the pressing need for an orbital
regime that provides for safe operation and sustainability of the space domain.
What is the near-term need?
The obvious near-term issues consist of existing organizations with on-going suborbital
point-to-point efforts such as the Virgin Galactic effort. Additionally, corporations like
BAE Systems is working hard on hypersonic air travel with a target operational capability
timeframe of 2025xiii. Above the Kármán line the number of objects orbiting the Earth
has reached a point that now raises concerns about the effectiveness of relying on the
“big sky theory” for preserving the ability to operate in the Space domain. The 2007
Chinese ASAT incident and the 2009 COSMOS-Iridium collision that followed increased
frequency of close conjunctions between orbiting objects has led to the study of a need
for a Space Traffic Management capability to be included in 2010 U.S. National Space
Policy and, now, substantive discussions between stakeholdersxiv. Additionally, the
increased capability to produce data on orbital objects is likely to outpace the current
U.S. Government ability to process the data xv. While steps are being taken to address
some aspects of this issue, a whole-of-government approach is required to fully address
the disparate issues that impact, or are impacted by, any potential solution to what is
now a near-term need.
A complete consideration of this topic must take into account not only physical
deconfliction of objects but also electromagnetic deconfliction as well as management of
space situational awareness capabilities and how those could be used to ensure a
sustainable, safe operating environment both below and above the Kármán line. The
FAA foresaw this concern and addressed it in Table 5 of the 2010 Point-to-Point
Commercial Space Transportation in National Aviation System reportxvi where specific
areas of study integration between air and space vehicles were outlined in a phased
approach culminating in detailed traffic management operational procedures for
scheduled, revenue-generating commercial operations being developed by 2020. In
October of 2004, the FAA, Air Force Space Command, NASA and representatives from
the Department of Defense worked with Booz, Allen, Hamilton to develop a Space
Vehicle Operators’ Concept of Operations that took the first steps toward addressing this

concept. Together, these documents lay out a need and potential courses of action for
addressing the technological growth that is likely to result in an overlap between routine
airborne, suborbital and orbital operations. When these documents were developed, the
need for safe operations above FL600 was a far-term issue and implementation
considerations were not as critical as today. This led to technical aspects of these
concepts being the primary focus of each document. Events since publication of these
documents have made policy and administrative considerations just as critical for
discussion.
Possible Courses of Action
Any plans to address the need for a Space Traffic Management solution must begin with
an end in mind and work back toward a solution. The 2006 COSMIC study on Space
Traffic Management developed the most widely accepted definition to date:
…the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into
outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free
of physical or radio-frequency interference.xvii
Starting from this point it is necessary to understand what it takes to have “access into
outer space”. By comparing the similarities between air and space operations it is
possible to break down process of each sortie into six distinct phases of operations:
Planning, Processing, Departure Ops, Flight Operations, Return and Landing, and
Refurbishment and Turnaround. These are depicted in the 2004 FIRST Space Vehicle
Operators’ Concept of Operations (See Figure 3). Each of these phases become critical
to understanding possible solutions as responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities are
addressed across the multiple entities that have some connection to addressing an
approach to developing a management regime (See Figure 4).

Figure 3: Six Phases of Space Flight Operations

The activities within each of these phases have been grouped in different manners in
any number of studies, but the general concept remains consistent regardless of naming
conventions. The similarities between space operations and aviation operations are
evident even with the most cursory reviews of these phases and brings to the forefront,
again, the idea that both future space and air operations should be studied in as a whole
as opposed to orbital situational awareness and suborbital operations.
Any new studies should begin with an understanding of what currently exists and how
those could be adapted or incorporated into a Space Traffic Management idea before
considering how to develop a new concept. Each organization with responsibilities,
authorities, or capabilities derives each initially from legislation or agreements. A review
of the U.S. Codes that govern existing organizations as well as applicable international
agreements is a principle consideration when studying potential methods of dealing with
activities above FL600. With at least seven distinct areas of U.S. Code that govern
different aspects of aviation and space flight it is inevitable that some changes would
have to occur in order to most effectively implement any new concepts. Figure 5
highlights areas of the U.S. Code that address different, sometimes overlapping, aspects
of aviation and space flight and offers suggestions as to where to consider changes.

Figure 4: Responsibilities, Authorities and Capabilities for STM
Each of the Executive Branch entities that currently, or potentially could, have
responsibilities, authorities, or capabilities associated with some aspect of aviation or
space operations will find that any new concept dealing with routine operations above
FL600 will inevitably see recommendations for changes to their respective current

responsibilities, authorities, or capabilities. Even if these changes are considered
“acceptable”, the process for making any legislative or regulatory changes is very difficult
and time consuming. The Government Accountability Office recently expressed their
concern over this issue in a report when they stated “The FAA will need years to learn
how to regulate space” xviii. While the FAA currently has Title 51 authorities and
responsibilities, they primarily relate to terrestrial concepts such as licensing of launches
and not the operational aspects of spaceflight similar to their authorities with respect to
operational aspects of airborne operations. To further emphasize the concern, the
Government Accountability Office comment was in reference to only small changes the
FAAs current Title 51 responsibilities and authorities and not to significant changes
being considered in many Space Traffic Management discussions.

Figure 5: Responsibilities, Authorities Discussion Starting Point
The US Senate has begun to work toward addressing some of these concerns by
passing the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (S.1297), which, if
signed into law, requires the Director of Science and Technology Policy to identify
appropriate oversight authorities for current and near-term, commercial, nongovernmental activities conducted in spacexix. This suggests there is enough backing
from high-ranking individual in the US Government to begin looking for a focal point for
discussing regulatory interactions required by the technological expansion of routine
transportation above the current Class A airspace. As individuals begin looking at
potential ways to meet the task this legislation will give them, it is likely they will employ
expertise from the same organizations that developed the 2004 FIRST Space Vehicle
Operators’ Concept of Operations. The red indicators in figure 5 indicate changes that
might be recommended in order to consider a similar path to develop integrated control

and management centers such as the ones in figure 6, the hierarchy of control centers.
Many concepts have followed the 2004 ideas described in figure 6, however, the basic
concept is consistent with the more matured discussions that have progressed beyond
the general ideas and definitions associated with Space Traffic Management. The
hierarchy of control centers depiction considers integration of routine point-to-point
operations with existing global aviation activities as well as inclusion of orbital
operations. However, it still regards the centers as Space Traffic “Control” centers while
specifically categorizing each under a portion of a Space and Air Traffic Management
System. A critical distinction between “Control” and “Management” is also established in
the FIRST CONOP which delineates a tactical process of instructing owner/operators on
how to avoid hitting other objects or craft and the operational-level process of planning
for traffic flows, departures and arrivals.

Figure 6: Hierarchy of Control Centersxx

Understanding the nuances in the nomenclature also aids in understanding the
recommendations for specific changes to legislation depicted in figure 5. “Management”

of air and space traffic is not as difficult to develop as a “control” function simply based
on the absence of authority that exists during the types of flights being considered in this
paper. Domestic “control” authority for flights above FL600 was considered as part of
the FIRST CONOPS (Figure 7) and development of this concept would be possible with
changes to Title 49 and Title 51 authorities (at the most basic level). However, due to
the altitudes and speeds involved, point-to-point transportation above FL600 is less likely
to be domestic activity (although the potential does exist) and more likely to be
international activities requiring adaptations to existing agreements or expansion of
International Civil Aviation Organization roles in creating Standards and Recommended
Procedures to be adopted by participating States. This possibility was also considered
in the FIRST CONOPS (Figure 8) which describes how management and control of
high-altitude, high-speed operations can be safely accomplished. Changes in the US
national Airspace System have already began which lend to this concept becoming a
reality.

Figure 7: Controlling Air and Space Traffic
In 2012, the FAA began to implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) airspace system in stages with an anticipated completion date of 2025.
NextGen proposes to transform the NAS from ground-based navigation systems to a
satellite-based systems. Without the service volume limitation of VORs, a satellitebased navigation system opens up the possibility of redefining the top of Class A

airspace and potentially defining the top of the U.S. National Airspace System as,
potentially, the Kármán line. This effort would have to include providing the capability
the FAA currently lacks above FL600 for communications and surveillance. This idea
would enable the concepts in Figures 5, 6, and 7 and help to foster routine, revenueproducing, point-to-point suborbital flights. It would also raise the issue of defining
“Space” as that area above the National Airspace System. Defining “space” creates a
significant number of policy, treaty, and legal issues that would impact how the U.S.
interacts with many countries around the globe. This was avoided previously by not
providing a top to the class E airspace above FL600 as defined in Title 49 §71.71. For
this reason, it is likely that any new laws, regulations, or policies developed by the U.S.
would be crafted so as to continue to avoid defining “space”
However, any attempt to fully address STM would need to include, at some later stage of
development, at least the 191 member states to the ICAO convention. Just as the 22 Air
Route Traffic Control Centers across the U.S.xxi help sustain safe air operations above
the United States, several regional centers would be needed around the world for any
routine point-to-point high-altitude operations as well. This global, high-altitude concept
was considered in the FIRST CONOP and is depicted in Figure 7 depicting the extent of
the international cooperation involved in a successful routine point-to-point high altitude
transportation concept.

Figure 8: Regional Control/Management Centers xxii
In the recent past the International Civil Aviation Organization has shown interest in
exploring global Space Traffic Management concepts when late President Emeritus of
the ICAO Council, Assad Kotaite, recommended a new annex to the Chicago
Convention to extend International Civil Aviation Organization responsibilities for

producing International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for suborbital
and orbital civil space flights xxiii. Historically International Civil Aviation Organization
initiatives have been led by the U.S. and given the vast technological lead in this area,
the effort to develop and STM concept would benefit from U.S. leadership.
Is STM a Pressing Concern?
Over several decades many intelligent people have put a great deal of effort into thinking
through the impending problems associated with the technological advances that enable
safe and sustained routine travel above FL600. In that time, no event or issue has been
urgent enough to cause the U.S., or any other country, to earnestly begin development
of a means to manage these high-altitude operations. However recent announcements
could suggest that the time for action is quickly approaching.
The FAA, as we know it, became a critical need following the public outcry after two
airliners collided over the Grand Canyon in 1956xxiv. Although similar incidents have
occurred in space, the public outcry was not as significant because there was no loss of
life and no noticeable impact on Earth. In recent years the U.S. fiscal situation has
limited initiatives that are not solutions to an immediate, critical issue and regardless of
the seriousness of the concern by those who believe a catastrophic incident is inevitable,
the fragile nature of the space domain is not easily understood by the general public and
thus political pressure is not felt by decision-makers within the U.S. Government. In
addition to the previously-mentioned U.S. Senate effort take specific actions toward
addressing this need and the Department of Defense and the U.S. Intelligence
Community have begun to consider threats to its assets in the space domain serious
enough to apply scarce resources on developing a backup to their Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC)xxv. The facility, known as the Joint Interagency Combined
Space Operations Center (JICSpOC), is evidence that decision-makers have prioritized
the sustainment and unimpeded exploitation of the space domain high enough to
expend money and manpower. The JICSpOC and JSpOC are currently being designed
to share the workload of tracking, cataloging, and predicting conjunction events of onorbit objects. Additionally, the JSpOC currently accomplishes several activities that are
specific to flights below the orbital areas of operation such as working with the FAA to
de-conflict launch and return of space systems with air traffic within the national airspace
system. Additionally the JSpOC provides collision avoidance data to commercial launch
customers and occasionally to international launches.
The JICSpOC is not intended to take responsibilities from the JSpOC but rather to
conduct experimentation and testing on concepts for countering threats to U.S. space
capabilities from October 2015 to January 2017. It is highly likely that the during these
studies of how to work with the JSpOC personnel will consider options similar to those
raised during Space Traffic Management discussions over the last few decades. One
Space Traffic Management study highlighted the non-military JSpOC activities that could
be transitioned to another organization (See Figure 9).

Figure 9: Possible Responsibility Transition to Civil Organizationxxvi
On-going discussions between the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department
of Defense have suggested multiple, widely-varying concepts for transitioning nonmilitary responsibilities from the JSpOC. While no clear path has materialized, sincere
discussions continue to be held on a fairly regular basis and offering some hope to those
who believe the need for a transition of responsibilities is vital to an expanding industry.
Additionally, commercial organizations such as the Space Data Association and AGI’s
COMSpOC have made efforts to demonstrate a potential commercial optionxxvii. While
these alternatives offer a great deal of promise, the technical, security, and logistical
hurdles makes this concept less appealing to the Air Force.
Summary
The airspace above the U.S. is the busiest and safest in the world. As technological
advances push routine operations above FL600 it has become necessary to look back at
work done in recent decades that consider methods of maintaining that level of safety.
In addition, recent changes to the FAA’s effort to transition to a satellite-based primary
navigation system within the National Airspace System will aid in addressing current and
future commercial, government and soon civilian operations above the current Class A
airspace. Stakeholders will also have to consider all responsibilities, authorities, and
capabilities that are derived from existing laws, regulation and treaties as new ones are
developed, or altered, to address the quickly advancing atmospheric operations as well

as suborbital and orbital operations that are inextricably linked together. Transitioning
current Department of Defense responsibilities for providing orbital conjunction warnings
to satellite owner/operators to the FAA could be a start to developing an effective Space
Traffic Management system that encompasses operations above, below and across the
Kármán Line. Given the technological need and the willingness of the U.S. Government
to begin to address the issue, a functioning STM capability is closer to reality than ever.
Because of the work done in the past to address the art of the possible, the justification
for the need for STM, and the effort to foresee future needs, the effort to convince is
coming to a successful end. Today the question is not why or when… but how.
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